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I. INTRODUCTION
The phrase “excusable neglect” has special meaning in the law. For
example, a party that misses a deadline for filing a pleading may still be
able to file the pleading after the time for doing so has expired if it can
demonstrate that its failure was the product of excusable neglect.1 A
party may be required to demonstrate excusable neglect to avoid
sanctions for untimely action,2 or to obtain relief from a final judgment
or order.3 Perhaps most importantly, a party may have to show excusable
neglect if it hopes to pursue an appeal after failing to timely file a notice
of appeal. In federal courts, a party that wants to take an appeal from a
final judgment or order in a district court must under Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(a) file a notice of appeal with the district clerk
†
Senior Vice President, Professional Services Group, Aon Risk Services, Chicago,
Illinois. J.D., University of Kansas; M.Ed., University of Nebraska; B.S., Fort Hays State
University. Opinions expressed here are the author’s alone.
1
FED. R. CIV. P. 6(b).
2
See, e.g., Matajek v. Skowronska, 893 So. 2d 700, 701-02 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2005) (finding no excusable neglect and therefore sanctioning lawyer for late filing of
mediation questionnaire).
3
See FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(1); see, e.g., Scoggins v. Jacobs, 610 S.E.2d 428, 432
(N.C. Ct. App. 2005) (finding that party’s failure to retain counsel was not excusable
neglect warranting relief from judgment); Williams Corner Investors, L.L.C. v. Areawide
Cellular, L.L.C., 676 N.W.2d 168, 172-74 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (refusing under
Wisconsin law to set aside default judgment based on excusable neglect).
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within thirty days after that judgment or order is entered, or within sixty
days if the United States or its agency or officer is a party.4 A district
court may under Rule 4(a)(5)(A) extend the time to file a notice of
appeal if (1) a party so moves within the original appeal period or no
later than thirty days thereafter; and (2) regardless of whether its motion
is filed before or during the time prescribed in Rule 4(a) expires, the
party “shows excusable neglect or good cause.”5 Some states have
adopted rules of appellate procedure modeled on the federal rules,
likewise adopting the excusable neglect and good cause standards for
allowing late appeals.6
In 2004, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit,
sitting en banc, decided Pincay v. Andrews,7 referred to here as Pincay II.
In Pincay II, the court affirmed a district court’s finding of excusable
neglect—and thus its decision to extend a party’s time to appeal—when
a lawyer left to a paralegal serving as his law firm’s calendaring clerk
responsibility for calendaring appellate deadlines and the paralegal
calendared the wrong date.8 The decision in Pincay II is noteworthy
because courts have traditionally rejected the notion that a lawyer’s
delegation of tasks to another lawyer or to a non-lawyer employee
amounts to excusable neglect if the other lawyer or staff member errs.9
Furthermore, the real problem in Pincay II was that the paralegal charged
with calendaring the appellate deadlines inexplicably misread the clear
language of Rule 4(a)(1),10 and courts have overwhelmingly held that a
lawyer’s failure to understand the plain language of federal rules cannot
4

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A).
6
See, e.g., Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 910 P.2d 116 (Haw. 1996).
7
389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
8
Id. at 854-60.
9
See, e.g., Cleek Aviation v. United States, 20 Cl. Ct. 766, 767, 770 (1990) (holding
that there was no excusable neglect where secretary incorrectly addressed envelope),
superseded by rule as stated in Cygnus Corp. v. United States, 65 Fed. Cl. 646 (2005);
Borio v. Coastal Marine Constr. Co., 881 F.2d 1053, 1056 (11th Cir. 1989) (holding “that
it is not excusable neglect when counsel fails to file a timely appeal because his or her
secretary misfiles the notice of appeal in her own files”), abrogated by Advanced
Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 77 F.3d 1322 (11th Cir. 1996); Airline Pilots v. Exec.
Airlines, Inc., 569 F.2d 1174, 1175 (1st Cir. 1978) (finding that secretary’s failure to
diary the correct date did not constitute excusable neglect), abrogation recognized by
Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc., 270
F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2001); Home Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Jonathan DeYoung, P.C., 156 F.
Supp. 2d 488, 491 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (finding no excusable neglect where lawyer directed a
newly-hired part time assistant to calendar appellate deadline); United States v. Virginia,
508 F. Supp. 187, 190-93 (E.D. Va. 1981) (finding no excusable neglect where attorney
dictated instructions concerning notice of appeal but lawyer working with him never
followed up with respect to appeal and tape was lost).
10
See Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 855.
5
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constitute excusable neglect.11 A different result should not obtain simply
because a lawyer delegates the task of reading and applying a rule to
non-lawyer support staff.
The decision in Pincay II is potentially significant from a
professional liability perspective, because legal malpractice specialists
urge law firms to create centralized work control systems in which nonlawyer staff record and monitor deadlines.12 It is also significant as a
practical matter because the delegation of tasks such as calendaring
deadlines to non-lawyer staff is commonplace today, at least at large and
sophisticated law firms. In any event, Pincay II appears to dramatically
relax the excusable neglect standard and to reward lawyers for abdicating
their professional responsibilities. This article explains why Pincay II
was wrongly decided and discusses some implications for lawyers.
II. EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
Rule 4(a)(5) allows a district court to extend the deadline for filing
a notice of appeal if the motion for extension is made within the original
appeal period or within thirty days thereafter, and the moving party
“shows excusable neglect or good cause.”13 The “excusable neglect” and
“good cause” standards in Rule 4(a)(5) are separate and distinct;14 they
“are not interchangeable.”15 Although some courts have reasoned that
good cause applies only to requests for extensions made before the
original period for filing a notice of appeal expires, while excusable
neglect applies to requests made afterwards,16 that is plainly wrong.17

11
See, e.g., Kaubisch v. Weber, 408 F.3d 540, 543 (8th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1163-64 (10th Cir. 2004); Graphic Commc’ns, 270 F.3d at 7-8;
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 997 (11th Cir. 1997); Prizevoits
v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 133-34 (7th Cir. 1996); Weinstock v. Cleary, Gottlieb,
Steen & Hamilton, 16 F.3d 501, 503 (2d Cir. 1994).
12
See 1 RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 2.23, at
204 (5th ed. 2000).
13
FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5)(A).
14
See Virella-Nieves v. Briggs & Stratton Corp., 53 F.3d 451, 453 (1st Cir. 1995)
(observing when discussing earlier case that “the two standards occupy distinct spheres”).
15
20 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 304App.07[2], at
304App.-34 (3d ed. 1997 & Supp. 2004) [hereinafter MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE].
16
See, e.g., Lorenzen v. Employees Ret. Plan of the Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 896
F.2d 228, 231 (7th Cir. 1990); Parke-Chapley Constr. Co. v. Cherrington, 865 F.2d 907,
909-10 (7th Cir. 1989) (citing cases from several federal judicial circuits); Seyler v.
Burlington N. Santa Fe Corp., 121 F. Supp. 2d 1352, 1355 n.3 (D. Kan. 2000) (citing
cases).
17
See Bishop v. Corsentino, 371 F.3d 1203, 1207 (10th Cir. 2004); Virella-Nieves,
53 F.3d at 453-54; see also Enos v. Pac. Transfer & Warehouse, Inc., 910 P.2d 116, 12023 (Haw. 1996) (discussing HAW. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5), which is modeled on FED. R. APP. P.
4(a)(5)).
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The applicability of one standard or the other turns not on when a party
moves for an extension of time, but on whether the need for an extension
is the movant’s fault.18 Where the movant bears no fault related to the
requested extension, as where the extension is necessitated by events
beyond the movant’s control, the good cause standard applies.19 Where
there is fault, excusable neglect is the measure. As a leading treatise
explains:
The excusable neglect standard applies in situations in which
there is fault; in such situations, the need for an extension is
usually occasioned by something within the control of the
movant. The good cause standard applies in situations in which
there is no fault—excusable or otherwise. In such situations, the
need for an extension is usually occasioned by something that is
not within the control of the movant.
Thus, the good cause standard can apply to motions brought
during the 30 days following the expiration of the original
deadline. If, for example, the Postal Service fails to deliver a
notice of appeal, a movant might have good cause to seek a postexpiration extension. It may be unfair to make such a movant
prove that its “neglect” was excusable, given that the movant
may not have been neglectful at all. Similarly, the excusable
neglect standard can apply to motions brought prior to the
expiration of the original deadline. For example, a movant may
bring a pre-expiration motion for an extension of time when an
error committed by the movant makes it unlikely that the movant
will be able to meet the original deadline.20

Good cause is a relatively easy standard to apply and it is rarely
invoked.21 Disputes involving Rule 4(a)(5) mostly turn on the meaning of
excusable neglect. Courts long held neglect to be excusable “only in
unique or extraordinary circumstances.”22 Then, in 1993, the Supreme
Court endorsed a more generous interpretation of excusable neglect in

18

Bishop, 371 F.3d at 1207 (quoting FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(5) advisory committee’s
note (2002 Amendments)); Webster v. Pacesetter, Inc., 270 F. Supp. 2d 9, 14 (D.D.C.
2003) (same).
19
Mirpuri v. ACT Mfg., Inc., 212 F.3d 624, 630 (1st Cir. 2000).
20
20 MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 15, § 304App.07[2], at 304App.-34.
21
See Mirpuri, 212 F.3d at 630 (noting that good cause standard applies to a “narrow
class of cases in which a traditional ‘excusable neglect’ analysis would be inapposite”).
22
Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence, Inc.,
270 F.3d 1, 4 (1st Cir. 2001) (discussing First Circuit precedent and quoting Pontarelli v.
Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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Pioneer Investment Services Co. v. Brunswick Associates Ltd.
Partnership.23
In Pioneer, the Court was called upon to decide whether an
attorney’s inadvertent failure to timely file a bankruptcy proof of claim
could constitute excusable neglect within the meaning of Bankruptcy
Rule 9006(b)(1).24 The Court concluded that the determination of
whether a party’s neglect is excusable “is at bottom an equitable one,
taking account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
omission.”25 Where appropriate, federal courts may “accept late filings
caused by inadvertence, mistake, or carelessness, as well as by
intervening circumstances beyond the party’s control.”26 In determining
whether to allow late filings, circumstances that courts should consider
include “the danger of prejudice to the [non-moving party], the length of
the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for
the delay, including whether it was within the reasonable control of the
movant, and whether the movant acted in good faith.”27
Although decided in the bankruptcy context, the Pioneer approach
logically applies to controversies under other rules where excusable
neglect is the standard for granting extensions of time,28 such as Rule
4(a)(5).29 Thus, in deciding whether to allow a party to file a notice of
23

507 U.S. 380 (1993).
Id. at 382-83. Rule 9006(b)(1) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
provides:
when an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified period
by these rules or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court, the court
for cause shown may at any time in its discretion (1) with or without motion
or notice order the period enlarged if the request therefor is made before the
expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous
order or (2) on motion made after the expiration of the specified period
permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of excusable
neglect.
25
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395.
26
Id. at 388.
27
Id. at 395.
28
See, e.g., George Harms Constr. Co. v. Chao, 371 F.3d 156, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2004)
(applying the Pioneer four-factor analysis in the FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b) context); In re
Vitamins Antitrust Class Actions, 327 F.3d 1207, 1209-10 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (discussing
Rules 60(b) and 6(b) with respect to class action opt-outs); Bateman v. U.S. Postal Serv.,
231 F.3d 1220, 1223-25 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying Pioneer in Rule 60(b) context).
29
See In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine/Fenfluramine/Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab.
Litig., 401 F.3d 143, 153-54 (3d Cir. 2005); Halicki v. La. Casino Cruises, Inc., 151 F.3d
465, 469 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998) (“In extending Pioneer to Rule 4(a)(5), we follow each of
our sister circuits to have addressed the issue.”); City of Chanute v. Williams Natural Gas
Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1046 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Because the Court’s analysis [in Pioneer] of
what constitutes ‘excusable neglect’ in the bankruptcy context rested on the plain
meaning of the terms, there is no reason that the meaning would be different in the
context of Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(5).”).
24

124

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 2:119

appeal out of time, a court should consider (1) the danger of prejudice to
the non-moving party; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact
on judicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay; and (4) whether the
movant acted in good faith.30 These four factors do not bear equal
weight; the third factor—the reason for the delay—clearly is the most
important.31 This makes sense, because the first, second and fourth
factors easily favor the movant in most cases; non-moving parties are
seldom prejudiced because delays in this context are usually short, and
delays attributable to bad faith are exceedingly rare.32
When it comes to the reason for the delay, it is important to
understand that even under the equitable and flexible Pioneer standard
not any excuse will suffice.33 The moving party still must offer a
“satisfactory explanation” for its tardiness.34 Courts often hold neglect to
be inexcusable.35 In making excusable neglect determinations, a party’s
fault or that of its attorneys is the most important consideration.36
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S TRANSFORMATION OF EXCUSABLE NEGLECT
In the Ninth Circuit, as elsewhere, a lawyer’s mistake of law, such
as misinterpreting a clear rule, generally does not constitute excusable
neglect.37 Accordingly, the court’s en banc decision in the case we will
call Pincay II,38 in which the court reheard a panel decision in the case
known as Pincay I,39 surprised many trial and appellate lawyers.
A. The Pincay Decisions
The Pincay decisions arose out of a RICO action. Pincay obtained a
judgment against Andrews in a federal district court on July 3, 2002, and,
30

See Gibbons v. United States, 317 F.3d 852, 854 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Pioneer).
Id. (quoting Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 463 (8th Cir.
2003)); Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence,
Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2001); City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046.
32
See Silivanch v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 366 (2d Cir. 2003) (quoting
and citing Lowry, 211 F.3d at 463).
33
See Graphic Commc’ns, 270 F.3d at 5.
34
Id.
35
See, e.g., Gibbons, 317 F.3d at 855 (affirming district court’s conclusion that
neglect was not excusable); Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir.
1996) (“If there was ‘excusable’ neglect here, we have difficulty imagining a case of
inexcusable neglect.”).
36
City of Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046.
37
See, e.g., Kyle v. Campbell Soup Co., 28 F.3d 928, 932 (9th Cir. 1994)
(concluding that district court abused its discretion by finding that lawyer’s mistaken
reliance upon FED. R. CIV. P. 6(e) constituted excusable neglect).
38
Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
39
Pincay v. Andrews, 351 F.3d 947 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pincay I), reh’g granted, 367
F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), on reh’g, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
31
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because the government was not a party to the action, Andrews’s notice
of appeal was due thirty days later.40 On July 10, the paralegal
functioning as calendaring clerk at Boies, Schiller & Flexner (“Boies”),41
the sophisticated law firm representing Andrews, faxed a copy of the
judgment to the lead lawyer, who was out of the office at the time.42 The
lawyer and the paralegal than exchanged e-mails and, in that exchange,
the paralegal told the lawyer that Andrews had sixty days to take an
appeal under Rule 4, making the notice of appeal due on September 3 in
light of the Labor Day holiday.43 The lawyer accepted this, nonetheless
instructing the paralegal to calendar the due date a few days ahead of
Labor Day.44 The lawyer never read Rule 4 himself, nor did he otherwise
check the paralegal’s time calculation.45 Of course, Andrews had only
thirty days in which to file a notice of appeal, not sixty.46
The lawyer learned of trouble with Andrews’s appeal on August 22
when Pincay filed a notice in Andrews’s parallel bankruptcy proceeding
indicating that the judgment was final and that the appeal period had
expired.47 On August 25, Andrews moved to extend the time in which to
appeal from the July 3 judgment.48 In that motion, Andrews asserted that
Boies relied on the calendar clerk to calculate appellate deadlines, that
the clerk made a mistake, and that this mistake amounted to excusable
neglect.49 The district court applied Pioneer and concluded that
Andrews’s time in which to appeal should be extended because
“‘attorney mistakes made in good faith with no prejudice to the other
party are excusable neglect.’”50 Pincay appealed.51
In Pincay I, the court stated that “Andrews’s counsel did not show
good cause for his failure to file” a timely notice of appeal, nor could he
establish excusable neglect.52 Rather:
What counsel did was to delegate a professional task to a
nonprofessional to perform. Knowledge of the law is a lawyer’s
40

FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1).
The fact that Boies, Schiller & Flexner represented Andrews is not mentioned in
the opinion. See Charles Delafuente, Not Late, Just Mistaken, 3 No. 47 A.B.A. J. EReport 4 (Dec. 3, 2004) (identifying the law firm).
42
Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 948-49.
43
Id. at 949.
44
Id.
45
See id. at 951.
46
See FED. R. APP. P. 4(a)(1)(A).
47
Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 949.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 954 (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting) (quoting the district court’s order).
51
Id. at 949.
52
Id.
41
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stock in trade. Bureaucratization of the law such that the lawyer
can turn over to nonlawyers the lawyer’s knowledge of the law is
not acceptable for our profession.53

On appeal, as he did in the district court, Andrews focused on the
calendaring clerk’s mistake, which he characterized as “an unexplained
aberration by a man experienced in court procedures.”54 The Pincay I
court thought this focus wrong, stating:
The focus must be on the lawyer. Paralegals and other
nonlawyers perform services in firms; many of the services
involve knowledge of the law and were once performed by junior
lawyers. The economy of such delegation is evident. But
delegation cannot be made of responsibility for personal
knowledge. When the lawyer delegates, he retains responsibility
for knowing the law.55

The lawyer’s admitted ignorance of the law, supposedly justifying
his reliance on the clerk, did not help Andrews.
Not knowing the law governing one’s practice is different from
mere neglect, and it cannot be classified as excusable neglect. No
axiom is more familiar than, “Ignorance of the law is no excuse.”
This ordinary rule is not a per se rule, but it ordinarily applies to
those whose profession is the law.
Nowhere in the proceedings in this case does the lawyer state that
he had read the federal rules governing appeals. Nowhere does he
state that he misremembered them. All that the lawyer states is
that he relied on his clerk. A lawyer’s obligation to know relevant
law cannot be delegated in this way to a nonlawyer. A solo
practitioner would not even be in a position to attempt this kind
of delegation. Membership in a large firm does not give the
lawyer leave to delegate to others the basic rules of the lawyer’s
practice.56

The Pincay I court concluded that under Pioneer, ignorance of clear
rules or mistakes in construing them do not ordinarily constitute
excusable neglect.57 In this case, the lawyer’s ignorance of the rules was
compounded by his delegation of his need to know the rules to a non-

53

Id. at 950.
Id. at 951.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id. at 951-52 (discussing Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship,
507 U.S. 380, 388 (1993)).
54
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lawyer whose actions he was unwilling to accept responsibility for.58
Accordingly, the court held that the district court abused its discretion in
extending Andrews’s time to appeal.59
Judge Kleinfeld dissented, asserting that following Pioneer
“[i]gnorance of the law and negligent delegation can indeed be classified
as excusable neglect.”60 Furthermore, he reasoned, the majority had
failed to afford the district court the deference it was due under the abuse
of discretion standard of review.61 Apparently spurred by the dissent, the
court as a whole voted to rehear the case en banc “to consider whether
the creation of a per se rule against delegation to paralegals, or indeed
any per se rule involving missed filing deadlines,” is consistent with
Pioneer.62 Thus came Pincay II.
The Pincay II court noted that the calendaring clerk’s error was
inexplicable. After all, the clerk calendared Andrews’s deadline to appeal
for sixty days out under Rule 4(a)(1)(B), as though the government were
a party, even though the case had been going on for fifteen years,
everyone should have known that the government was not a party, and
any lawyer or paralegal should have been able to read the applicable rule
correctly.63 The clerk’s misreading of Rule 4(a) was a critical error that
the district court easily could have concluded was inexcusable, thus
ending the litigation.64 Even so, the lawyer’s delegation to the clerk the
task of ascertaining the deadline for appealing was not “per se
inexcusable neglect.”65 As the court explained:
In the modern world of legal practice, the delegation of repetitive
legal tasks to paralegals has become a necessary fixture. Such
delegation has become an integral part of the struggle to keep
down the costs of legal representation. Moreover, the delegation
of such tasks to specialized, well-educated non-lawyers may well
ensure greater accuracy in meeting deadlines than a practice of
having each lawyer in a large law firm calculate each filing
deadline anew. The task of keeping track of necessary deadlines
will involve some delegation. The responsibility for the error
falls on the attorney regardless of whether the error was made by
an attorney or a paralegal. See Model Rules of Prof’l Conduct R.
5.5 cmt. 2 (2002) (“This Rule does not prohibit a lawyer from
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65

Id. at 952.
Id.
Id. (Kleinfeld, J., dissenting).
Id. at 955-56.
Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 856.
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employing the services of paraprofessionals and delegating
functions to them, so long as the lawyer supervises the delegated
work and retains responsibility for their work.”).66

The larger question, the Pincay II court reasoned, was “whether the
[clerk’s] misreading of the clear rule could . . . [be] considered excusable
neglect.”67 The clerk’s misreading of the rule was an “egregious”
mistake; the lawyer “undoubtedly” should have read the rule himself
rather than relying on the clerk; and the clerk and the lawyer both were
negligent as a result.68 But the fact that the clerk and the lawyer were
both negligent was the starting point in the court’s excusable neglect
analysis, not the end of it.69 The “real question” was whether the facts
were such that the determination of excusable neglect was within the
district court’s discretion.70
In analyzing this issue, the court focused on the third Pioneer
factor, the reason for the delay.71 Andrews characterized the reason for
the delay as “the failure of a ‘carefully designed’ calendaring system
operated by experienced paralegals that heretofore had worked
flawlessly.”72 Pincay, on the other hand, focused on the “degree of
carelessness” in the paralegal’s failure to read the appropriate
subparagraph of Rule 4(a)(1).73 Noting the equitable nature of the
inquiry, the court stated:
We recognize that a lawyer’s failure to read an applicable rule is
one of the least compelling excuses that can be offered; yet the
nature of the contextual analysis and the balancing of the factors
adopted in Pioneer counsel against the creation of any rigid rule.
Rather, the decision whether to grant or deny an extension of
time to file a notice of appeal should be entrusted to the
discretion of the district court because the district court is in a
better position than we are to evaluate factors such as whether the
lawyer had otherwise been diligent, the propensity of the other
side to capitalize on petty mistakes, the quality of the
representation of the lawyers (in this litigation over its 15-year
history), and the likelihood of injustice if the appeal was not
allowed. Had the district court declined to permit the filing of the

66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73

Id.
Id.
Id. at 858.
Id. at 858-59.
Id. at 859.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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notice, we would be hard pressed to find any rationale requiring
us to reverse.
Pioneer itself instructs courts to determine the issue of excusable
neglect within the context of the particular case, a context with
which the trial court is most familiar. Any rationale suggesting
that misinterpretation of an unambiguous rule can never be
excusable neglect is, in our view, contrary to that instruction.74

The court reasoned that under Pioneer there was no room for a
“rigid legal rule against late filings attributable to any particular type of
negligence.”75 The Pincay II court held that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in granting Andrews’s motion for an extension of
time in which to appeal and affirmed the district court’s order.76
B. Pincay II and Beyond
Although it is true that Pioneer counsels a flexible approach to
determining excusable neglect and that the abuse of discretion standard
by which district courts’ determinations of excusable neglect are
measured is extremely deferential, Pincay II is a seriously flawed
decision. For starters, this was not, as Andrews disingenuously
contended, a case about “the failure of a ‘carefully designed’ calendaring
system” that had previously “worked flawlessly.”77 The calendaring
system was not carefully designed. An unsupervised paralegal read rules
and calendared what he believed to be the correct deadlines. It is obvious
that no one was responsible for double-checking his work. Absent human
supervision, the “system” had no means of detecting errors. Furthermore,
the system did not fail; it worked flawlessly. “The wrong date was
calendared with meticulous efficiency and accuracy.”78 The problem was
that the paralegal misread a crystal clear rule and calendared the wrong
date, an error the court understandably described as “egregious.”79
Indeed, if the neglect in this case was excusable, it is hard to imagine a
case in which the neglect might be called inexcusable.80 Although it is
easy to feel sorry for the paralegal, who doubtless was horrified by his
error and remorseful for it, such feelings do not transform the paralegal’s
74

Id.
Id. at 860.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 859.
78
Id. at 862 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
79
Id. at 858.
80
See Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel. Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Here the
rule is crystal clear, the error egregious . . . . If there was ‘excusable’ neglect here, we
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unaccountable lapse into excusable neglect.81 Even after Pioneer, courts
generally hold that run-of-the-mill carelessness is not excusable
neglect.82
Even if it might be argued that a non-lawyer’s mere error in failing
to record a deadline may amount to excusable neglect,83 this was not
such a case. The problem was not that the calendaring clerk forgot to
record the correct deadline, but that he misread a plain rule and thus
recorded the wrong deadline. These are quite different errors.
Nor was this a case about “delegation to paralegals,” as the court
viewed it when voting for rehearing.84 This was a case about a lawyer’s
abdication of responsibility. “Abdication” and “delegation” are not
synonymous.
Andrews’s lawyer received a copy of the underlying judgment on
July 10, 2002, when the calendaring clerk faxed it to him; at that point,
the judgment was seven days old.85 Because he was out of the office, the
lawyer relied on the paralegal to tell him when the notice of appeal
would be due.86 The lawyer did not question the paralegal’s time
calculation or the basis for it, he did not ask the paralegal to e-mail the
rule to him, nor did he ask the paralegal to confirm his reading of the
appellate deadline with a lawyer in the office. When he returned to the
office, the lawyer checked the calendar and saw that the deadline in
Andrews’s case had been recorded.87 What the lawyer did not do—and
what he should have done—was check to see that the correct deadline
had been calendared.88 He never read Rule 4(a) to check the calendaring
clerk’s judgment.89 As the Pincay I court explained: “Knowledge of the
81
See id. at 133 (explaining that “[a]n unaccountable lapse is not excusable
neglect”).
82
See Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers., L.P., 109 F. App’x 670 (5th Cir. 2004)
(involving FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) and lawyer who lost cassette tape allegedly
constituting key evidence before trial, but who found tape in her office after trial); see,
e.g., Allen v. LTV Steel Co., 68 F. App’x 718, 722 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding no excusable
neglect for FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6) purposes where delay was caused by lawyer’s
“‘clerical mistake/oversight’”); Envisionet Computer Servs., Inc. v. ECS Funding L.L.C.,
288 B.R. 163, 165-67 (D. Me. 2002) (finding no excusable neglect where lawyer failed to
calendar deadline).
83
See, e.g., Walter v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United of Wis., 181 F.3d 1198, 1202
(11th Cir. 1999) (finding excusable neglect where lawyer’s former secretary failed to
record deadline).
84
Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
85
Pincay v. Andrews, 351 F.3d 947, 948-49 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pincay I), reh’g
granted, 367 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc)
(Pincay II).
86
Id. at 949.
87
Id.
88
Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 858.
89
Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 951.
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law is a lawyer’s stock in trade. Bureaucratization of the law such that
the lawyer can turn over to nonlawyers the lawyer’s knowledge of the
law is not acceptable for our profession.”90
It is perhaps understandable that the lawyer, while out of the office,
did not question the paralegal’s time calculation or ask the paralegal to
check with another lawyer in the office to make sure that he was
correctly reading the right rule. Although the paralegal’s report that
Andrews had sixty days in which to take an appeal should have given the
lawyer pause,91 the fact remains that he was out of the office and did not
have access to a rulebook or some other means of quickly examining
matters for himself. The lawyer’s failure to confirm the accuracy of such
a critical date upon his return to the office, however, is another matter. It
is difficult to imagine how the lawyer could not have thought to check
the accuracy of the paralegal’s time calculation when he returned to the
office. Again, the sixty-day period should have struck him as odd.92 As
the dissent in Pincay II pointed out, “the 30-day rule for appeals in
federal court is so well known among federal practitioners that, had the
lawyer but thought about the rule, rather than relying entirely on the
calendaring clerk’s representation, he surely would have realized that the
60-day period [was] wrong.”93 Although a court understandably might
excuse a novice lawyer’s lack of instinct or forgive the error of a lawyer
who only rarely practices in the federal system,94 nothing suggests that
Andrews’s lawyer was either young or a stranger to federal court.
Nowhere did Andrews’s lawyer state that he read the Federal Rules
of Appellate Procedure, or Rule 4(a) in particular.95 Nowhere did he state
that he knew the rules but simply recalled incorrectly the deadline for
taking an appeal.96 Never did he claim that the rules confused him. Never
did he assert that his travels prevented him from checking the paralegal’s
time calculation.97 Never did he confess error but claim that his neglect
90

Id. at 950.
See United States v. Virginia, 508 F. Supp. 187, 188 (E.D. Va. 1981) (noting that
the sixty days given to the government to appeal is an “extraordinary” time limit).
92
See Mark A. Drummond, Tardy Appeal Reinstated After Missed Deadline, LITIG.
NEWS, May 2005, at 7 (quoting veteran appellate lawyer as saying “‘the 30-day deadline
is so well known it seems inconceivable to me that the attorney would not have
immediately recognized the error’”).
93
Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 863 (Kozinksi, J., dissenting).
94
See United States v. Brown, 133 F.3d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming district
court’s finding of excusable neglect in case involving lawyer who was handling only one
federal case, the rest of his practice being confined to Wisconsin state courts).
95
Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 951.
96
Id.
97
Even if the lawyer had made this argument it seems unlikely that the court would
have been persuaded by it. See Dean v. Chicago Transit Auth., 118 F. App’x 993, 996
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was still excusable when judged according to the Pioneer test. Unlike the
lawyer in United States v. Brown,98 who, “[t]o his credit, . . . [did] not
point[] a finger at others for his failing—he blame[d] his own
misunderstanding of the rules,”99 Andrews’s lawyer declined
responsibility at every turn, always blaming the paralegal for the error.100
In common parlance, the lawyer threw the paralegal under the bus. That
should have done him no good, of course, because a lawyer cannot
escape professional responsibility by claiming that he delegated the
subject task to his staff,101 a principle that the Pincay II court expressly
recognized.102
Even accepting the argument that the lawyer delegated
responsibility to a paralegal who ran a carefully designed calendaring
system rather than abdicating responsibility for knowing the law, that
conduct is unrelated to the reason for the delay under the Pioneer test.
Rather, it bears on the fourth Pioneer factor, that being “whether the
movant acted in good faith.”103 But there was no allegation that
Andrews’s lawyer had delayed filing a notice of appeal in bad faith and,
absent that, Andrews’s good faith was inconsequential. “Extreme good
faith has no exonerating power of its own; bad faith can sink an
excusable neglect claim, and good faith is nothing but the absence of this
negative.”104
Although the Pincay II court repeatedly cited and referred to
Pioneer to justify a flexible approach to determining excusable neglect
and to explain its aversion to per se rules in this area, it is difficult to
reconcile the decision in Pincay II with the Court’s statement in Pioneer
that “inadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construing the
rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable neglect.’”105 In other words,
inadvertence, ignorance of the rules and mistakes construing the rules
constitute excusable neglect only in exceptional and rare

(7th Cir. 2005) (“An attorney’s busy schedule, however, does not rise to the level of
excusable neglect.”).
98
133 F.3d 993 (7th Cir. 1998).
99
Id. at 997.
100
See Pincay I, 351 F.3d at 951; Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir.
2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
101
See generally MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2004) (stating lawyers’
“Responsibilities Regarding Nonlawyer Assistants”); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW
GOVERNING LAWYERS § 11 (2005) (expressing “A Lawyer’s Duty of Supervision”).
102
Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 856.
103
Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P’ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395
(1993).
104
Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 862 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
105
Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 392.
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circumstances,106 as where the rule or the way in which it is
communicated to litigants are peculiar, or unusually ambiguous or
vague.107 “Pioneer did not alter the . . . rule that mistakes of law
[generally] do not constitute excusable neglect.”108
Nothing about the facts or law in Pincay II was exceptional or rare.
Rule 4(a) is clear. Any lawyer or paralegal should be able to read it
correctly.109 What the Pincay II court was presented with was not a
lawyer’s justifiable misunderstanding of an ambiguous rule, the peculiar
or confusing application of one rule when coupled with another, or some
complex or novel procedural posture, but garden variety inattention. That
is not excusable neglect under Pioneer.110 The simple miscalculation of
time deadlines is not excusable neglect after Pioneer,111 just as it was not
before.112 There is good reason for this:
Calculating time deadlines in the context of the demands of trial
practice is routine and ordinary. . . . Indeed, miscalculating the
time for filing is among the most ordinary types of neglect. . . . In
the absence of unique underlying circumstances that impel a
miscalculation, there is no way to verify a lawyer’s naked
representation that he or she miscalculated time requirements.113

In examining the reason for delay, some courts routinely consider
as part of that inquiry whether the inadvertence “reflected professional
incompetence,” such as ignorance of procedural rules, and whether the
asserted inadvertence “reflects an easily manufactured excuse incapable
of verification by the court.”114 By these measures, Andrews’s lawyer
clearly did not demonstrate excusable neglect. The lawyer was ignorant
of Rule 4(a) and his excuse for non-compliance with this clear rule was
easily manufactured.
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See Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence,
Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2001) (referring to “‘unique or extraordinary
circumstances’”) (citing Pontarelli v. Stone, 930 F.2d 104, 111 (1st Cir. 1991)).
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See Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 398-99.
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Ceridian Corp. v. SCSC Corp., 212 F.3d 398, 404 (8th Cir. 2000); see, e.g.,
Advanced Estimating Sys., Inc. v. Riney, 130 F.3d 996, 998 (11th Cir. 1997).
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Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 855.
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Lowry v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 464 (8th Cir. 2000).
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See, e.g., Advanced Estimating, 130 F.3d at 997-98; Villa v. Vill. of Elmore, 252
F. Supp. 2d 492, 494 (N.D. Ohio 2003); Thomas v. Bd. of Educ., 177 F.R.D. 488, 490-91
(D. Kan. 1997).
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Cange v. Stotler & Co., 913 F.2d 1204, 1212 (7th Cir. 1990).
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Barnes v. Cavazos, 966 F.2d 1056, 1061-62 (6th Cir. 1992) (citation omitted).
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Home Ins. Co. v. Law Offices of Jonathan DeYoung, P.C., 156 F. Supp. 2d 488,
490 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (citing In re Cendant Corp. Litig., No. 00-2185, 2001 WL 487903, at
*12 (3d Cir. May 9, 2001)).
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Any argument that the result in Pincay II was compelled by the
deferential standard of review the court was required to apply must fail.
Federal appellate courts regularly reverse district courts’ findings of
excusable neglect based on abuse of discretion.115 Consistency and
predictability in the law require as much.
The court in Pincay II also created two practical problems. First, by
affirming the district court’s finding of excusable neglect, the court
essentially created two different excusable neglect standards: one for
lawyers who practice in law firms or other organizations with ample
support staff, and one for sole practitioners. If an experienced sole
practitioner, who has handled previous appeals flawlessly and has timely
filed everything in every appellate case she has ever handled, misreads
Rule 4(a) and records the wrong date for filing a notice of appeal in her
desk planner, which she scrupulously checks first thing every morning
(the same planner in which she has always recorded all of her appellate
deadlines), and therefore files the notice of appeal late, can she
successfully claim that her client’s time to appeal should be extended
because of excusable neglect? Has not her client been betrayed by “the
failure of a ‘carefully designed’ calendaring system . . . that heretofore
worked flawlessly”?116 Indeed, is not the sole practitioner’s calendaring
system better than that employed by Boies, since in our hypothetical case
it is actually the lawyer who reads and interprets the applicable
procedural rules? The answer to the first question almost certainly is
“no” even though the answer to the second and third questions are “yes.”
The problems posed by that outcome are obvious.117
Second, but more important, the Pincay II court created exactly
what it wanted to avoid: a per se rule on excusable neglect. What is this
Ninth Circuit per se rule? It is this: if a law firm maintains a formal
calendaring system that depends solely on non-lawyer staff to calendar
the correct dates and one of those staff members calendars the wrong
date, such a failure constitutes excusable neglect so long as the firm
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See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 372 F.3d 1159, 1162-64 (10th Cir. 2004); Lowry
v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 211 F.3d 457, 462-64 (8th Cir. 2003); Silivanch v.
Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 333 F.3d 355, 370 (2d Cir. 2003); Deym v. von Fragstein, 127
F.3d 1102, 1997 WL 650933, at *3 (6th Cir. Oct. 16, 1997); Prizevoits v. Ind. Bell Tel.
Co., 76 F.3d 132, 134 (7th Cir. 1996); Allied Steel v. City of Abilene, 909 F.2d 139, 14243 (5th Cir. 1990).
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Pincay v. Andrews, 389 F.3d 853, 859 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay II).
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Of course, a sole practitioner might solve this problem by delegating all
calendaring responsibilities to her secretary. To the extent the Pincay II decision
encourages such delegation it certainly does not promote responsible law practice.
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satisfies the other Pioneer factors.118 Why is this a per se rule? Because,
as Judge Kozinski noted in his dissent:
Imagine what will happen the next time we get a case on
materially indistinguishable facts, except that the district court
found the delay inexcusable. Will it be just to tell the litigant that
his case is lost because he happened to draw the wrong district
judge?119

It is not reasonable to argue against a per se rule because it is
unlikely that the court will some day be called upon to decide a case with
materially indistinguishable facts. Andrews’s lawyer practiced in a
sophisticated law firm.120 Many large and sophisticated law firms employ
centralized calendaring systems that depend on non-lawyer staff for their
operation. The delegation of law-related tasks to non-lawyers has
become an integral and routine part of modern law practice.121 The
potential for error can be minimized, but it can never be eliminated.
In short, the Ninth Circuit will see other cases arising out of
substantially similar facts. The rules involved in these cases may be
different—perhaps the court will be construing excusable neglect in
connection with Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 6 or 60 rather than
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4—but the cases will come.
Unfortunately, because those cases probably will turn on the reason for
the delay rather than any of the other Pioneer factors, the court’s
decision in Pincay II will have the undesirable effect of encouraging and
rewarding careless lawyering.122
IV. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR LAWYERS
Lawyers should not rely on Pincay II. The case is wrongly decided.
The Ninth Circuit is out of step with all of its sister courts on this issue.
None of this means, of course, that lawyers and law firms cannot
rely on centralized calendaring and docketing systems that are
maintained by non-lawyer staff. Such systems are common and generally
118

See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 864 n.4 (Kozinski, J., dissenting).
120
Pincay v. Andrews, 351 F.3d 947, 951 (9th Cir. 2003) (Pincay I), reh’g granted,
367 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2004), vacated, 389 F.3d 853 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (Pincay
II).
121
Pincay II, 389 F.3d at 856.
122
See Graphic Commc’ns Int’l Union, Local 12-N v. Quebecor Printing Providence,
Inc., 270 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2001) (“To find this neglect [a party’s or counsel’s
misunderstanding of clear law or misreading of an unambiguous judicial decree]
‘excusable’ would only serve to condone and encourage carelessness and inattention in
practice before the federal courts, and render the filing deadline set in Fed. R. App. P.
4(a)(1) a nullity.”).
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are accurate and efficient. But, as the saying goes—and as Pincay I and
Pincay II demonstrate—“garbage in, garbage out.” The best systems are
valueless if the information that is calendared is inaccurate or incorrect.
Errors are less likely where a lawyer reads the applicable rule and tells
the calendaring clerk the date to record, rather than relying on a nonlawyer staff member to read the rule and correctly calculate due dates.
This is because lawyers are less likely than non-lawyers to misread
procedural rules. “Studying and practicing law develops certain skills
and habits of mind that . . . make lawyers more careful than non-lawyers
about reading rules.”123
At the very least, any system has to include some mechanism for
checking the accuracy of the dates being calendared.124 This may be
accomplished by lawyer supervision of non-lawyers within a central
system, or it may be accomplished through parallel systems in which
lawyers maintain their own calendars of case deadlines in addition to the
firm’s centralized calendaring system.125
Lawyers must assume that courts will treat the failure to read rules,
failure to understand rules and failure to properly apply rules as
inexcusable neglect. Few courts are likely to hold otherwise where a
lawyer delegates responsibility for rules interpretations to non-lawyer
staff. The bottom line is that lawyers must be responsible for reading
appropriate rules and deciding upon appropriate deadlines, even if the
task of calendaring such deadlines and ministerial acts designed to ensure
compliance are delegated to non-lawyers.
V. CONCLUSION
In federal courts, “the timely filing of a simple notice of appeal is
the only step required to take an appeal.”126 The timely filing of a notice
of appeal is both mandatory and jurisdictional. Nonetheless, a party may
file a notice of appeal out of time if it can demonstrate that its delay is
the product of “excusable neglect.” Other situations, in both federal and
state courts, likewise require litigants to demonstrate excusable neglect if
they are to be allowed late filing. The phrase thus has special meaning in
the law.
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Traditionally, courts have declined to hold that lawyers’ mere
inattention, or failure to understand or properly apply clear rules,
constitute excusable neglect. Courts have also declined to find excusable
neglect where lawyers delegate important tasks to secretaries and legal
assistants and those non-lawyers then fail to perform the ostensibly
simple tasks delegated to them. Courts do not allow lawyers to delegate
away their professional responsibilities.
In Pincay II, the Ninth Circuit upset all of these basic principles.
The court affirmed a district court’s finding of excusable neglect where a
lawyer abdicated his professional responsibilities and the paralegal to
whom those responsibilities fell misread a crystal clear rule of appellate
procedure. Although the court spoke of the need for lawyers to delegate
tasks to non-lawyer support staff in the modern practice of law, in Pincay
II the lawyer delegated nothing. What he did was abdicate responsibility.
In doing so, he nearly sank his client’s case.
Pincay II was wrongly decided. The court’s decision cannot be
logically explained. It is no answer to say that the court simply applied a
deferential abuse of discretion standard because appellate courts
routinely reverse district courts’ excusable neglect findings under that
standard. Lawyers must assume that courts will treat their failure to read
rules, failure to understand rules, and failure to properly apply rules as
inexcusable neglect, and practice accordingly. That is as it should be.

